STRUCTURAL DEPTH IN REFORMS INDUCED BY IMF PROGRAMS: INSIGHTS FROM THE FUND’S MAJOR DEBTORS
2024, 102, Numer 1
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This paper investigates the evolution of IMF structural conditionality, with a specific focus on non-core policy areas, across the Fund’s top debtors from 1984 to 2023. The author builds on the concept of structural depth as defined by the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO), categorizing it into high, medium, and low levels, guided by legal-economic perspectives. Analysing 1,233 conditions, she reveals nuanced patterns. The biggest borrowers often faced more policy prescriptions with significant share of non- core areas, while conditionality depth varies across countries and periods. Argentina’s unique case exhibits fewer and shallower conditions, despite significant challenges. Greece and Ukraine stand out with deep programs, attributed to the European influence. Recent agreements blend Washington Consensus-inspired and non-conventional measures, including social buffers and transparency. These developments, while positive, raise questions about their ability to transform borrowers into more resilient welfare states.
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